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Electronic Cash is a form of payment that is exchanged electronically. Cus-
tomers withdraw electronic coins from a bank and pay merchants with them.
The Merchants then deposit the coins to the Bank. This system involves com-
puter networks over which the payment is made. In the field of cryptography,
the topic has gained much attention over the past few decades. However, the use
is still relatively limited and small in scale.
One example is the Octopus card system in Hong Kong. The system began as
a public transit payment scheme and is now used more generally as an electronic
cash system. Singapore also has the same type of public transportation card. For
general purposes, the Netherlands has implemented an electronic cash system,
Chipknip.
There are many important features to an ideal electronic cash system. One
of them is providing anonymity to the customers as in the case of real cash.
Customers should be able to engage in transactions without having their identities
revealed. It is also critical that two transactions made by the same person are
not traceable by either the bank or the merchant.
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Another important aspect of electronic cash is prevention of duplication. Un-
like real cash, it is possible to make identical duplicates of electronic coins. In
fact, this is relatively easy, whereas duplicating real cash is quite difficult. This
creates the problem of double-spending in electronic schemes. An ideal electronic
cash system, therefore, should secure the anonymity of honest customers, while
revealing the identity of cheating customers and merchants.
Another major concern is divisibility of the electronic coins. Divisible elec-
tronic cash schemes allow a customer to withdraw a coin of worth $2`, to divide
the value, and then to spend the pieces. We will examine this feature in detail
shortly.
Overall, there are many aspects to observe in the electronic cash schemes.
Different authors have proposed various electronic cash systems, claiming to pro-
vide certain sets of features. In this thesis, we concentrate on studying the main
two aspects, divisibility and prevention of double-spending. A major part of the
thesis will be devoted to adding explicit details to the arguments that are only
sketched in Okamoto-Ohta and Eng-Okamoto. We will also look at some other
papers that use untraceability, unlinkability, transferability, and zero-knowledge
proofs.
In all the cash systems presented in this thesis, we have a set of participants.
Namely, the Bank (B), the Customer (U), and the Merchant (M). Different pro-
tocols are presented for each system, but they serve the same set of purposes.
An Ideal Cash System should have:
1. Independence: The security of an electronic coin should not depend on
physical properties of the coin. It should be possible to transfer it electron-
ically over a secure network.
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2. Security: One should not be able to copy and forge the cash. It is fairly
easy to make exact duplicates of an electronic document. This exposes
the electronic cash systems to the danger of double-spending. Therefore,
making the system secure is directly related to prevention of copying the
coins.
3. Untraceability (privacy): One cannot trace the relationship between the
user and his purchases. In the real cash system, when a customer spends
a bill, neither the bank nor the merchant can trace the identity of the
customer. We want to replicate this feature in the electronic cash system
in such a way that the customer’s identity is revealed only if he cheats.
4. Off-line payment: The merchant doesn’t need to be linked to the Bank
before accepting a coin from the Customer. M can simply collect coins
from different customers and deposit them later with B, when he brings
them to exchange e-cash for cash. Even though he accepted the coins from
customers without verifying with the Bank, he is ensured that the coins
will be accepted by the Bank if legitimate, or the cheating Customer will be
identified. Off-line schemes should also protect against cheating Merchants
who try to deposit a coin twice.
5. Transferability: Once an electronic coin is issued to a Customer, he should
be able to transfer all or a portion of the coin’s value to another customer.
The system must protect both the first and the second customers from
cheating against each other.
6. Divisibility: The Customer should be allowed to divide the value of an
electronic coin in any number of pieces he wants and to spend it one piece
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at a time.
7. Unlinkability: If the Customer U spends a portion of an electronic coin
with one Merchant, and then spends another portion of the same coin with
a different Merchant, the two transactions should not enable the Bank to
tell whether the two were made by the same person.
Okamoto-Ohta [9] lists the first six requirements. The unlinkability requirement
has been studied more recently. Note that credit cards do not satisfy (3). Prepaid
cards do not satisfy (1) and (7).
A company, DigiCash, is creating an electronic cash system that enables is-
suers to sell electronic coins at some value to individuals, who store them in
their own computers. However, it is not clear how this system could guarantee
untraceability since a third party records all transactions.
Digital cash provides many obvious benefits. But the solutions so far proposed






The paper [9] proposes the first ideal untraceable electronic cash system. This
system satisfies all six criteria that were mentioned earlier. The main feature of
the new system is the divisibility of the customer’s coin into many pieces in any
way he wants. The security of the system lies in the difficulty of factoring.
In using a cut-and-choose methodology, Okamoto and Ohta use a technique
involving square roots modulo N , where N is a Williams integer, and a binary
tree.
2.2 Preliminaries
Definition 1. N is called a Blum integer if N = pq, where p and q are primes,
p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4). N is called a Williams integer if N = pq,
where p and q are primes, p ≡ 3 (mod 8) and q ≡ 7 (mod 8).
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Observe that a Williams integer is also a Blum integer.
Definition 2. Let p be an odd prime and let a 6≡ 0 (mod p). Define the Legendre
symbol (a/p) = +1, if x2 ≡ a (mod p) has a solution, −1 if x2 ≡ a (mod p) has
no solution.
Some properties of the Legendre symbol are:
Proposition 1. Let p be an odd prime.
1. If a ≡ b 6≡ 0 (mod p), then (a/p) = (b/p).
2. If a 6≡ 0 (mod p), then (a/p) ≡ a(p−1)/2 (mod p).
3. If ab 6≡ 0 (mod p), then (ab/p) = (a/p)(b/p).
4. (−1/p) = (−1)(p−1)/2.
We are now ready to define Jacobi symbol, which extends the Legendre symbol
from primes p to composite odd integers n.
Definition 3. Let n be an odd positive integer and let a be a nonzero integer









If N = pq (where p, q are primes), we can classify the elements of Z∗N into
four classes:
Z(1,1) = {x ∈ Z∗N | (x/p) = 1, (x/q) = 1}
Z(1,−1) = {x ∈ Z∗N | (x/p) = 1, (x/q) = −1}
Z(−1,1) = {x ∈ Z∗N | (x/p) = −1, (x/q) = 1}
Z(−1,−1) = {x ∈ Z∗N | (x/p) = −1, (x/q) = −1}
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Proposition 2. Let N be a Blum integer, and let x be an element of Z(1,1). Then,
for any integer t ≥ 1, there are four values y1, y2, y3, y4 such that y2
t
i ≡ x (mod N)
and such that y1 ∈ Z(1,1), y2 ∈ Z(1,−1), y3 ∈ Z(−1,1), y4 ∈ Z(−1,−1). In addition,
y1 ≡ −y4 and y2 ≡ −y3. Also, (y1/N) = (y4/N) = 1 and (y2/N) = (y3/N) = −1.
The proposition is proved using by working mod p and q separately, then
using the Chinese remainder theorem.
A consequence of this proposition is that four values of a 2t-th root y of x can
be uniquely specified by two bits of information; the value of (y/N) and whether
0 < y < N/2 or not.
Proposition 3. Let N = pq be a Williams integer. Then, for any x ∈ Z∗N , there
is a unique a ∈ {±1,±2} such that ax ∈ Z(1,1).
This follows immediately from the facts
(−1/p) = (−1/q) = −1, (2/p) = −1, (2/q) = 1.




denote the value of y ∈ Z(1,1) such that y2








denote the value of y ∈ Z∗N such that (y/N) = −1 and 0 < y < N/2. For z ∈ Z∗N ,
let
〈z〉QR = dz mod N,
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where d ∈ {±1,±2} is chosen so that dz ∈ Z(1,1), and let
〈z〉1 = d′z mod N,
where d′ ∈ {1, 2} is chosen so that (d′z/N) = 1.
The following are the main keys to catching double spenders in the Okamoto-
Ohta scheme.
Factorization principle. Let n be an integer and suppose there exist integers
x and y with x2 ≡ y2 (mod n), but x 6≡ ±y (mod n). Then n is composite, and
gcd(x − y, n) gives a nontrivial factor of n.
For a proof, see [12].
Proposition 4. Let N be a Williams integer and let x, y ∈ Z∗N . If (x/N) 6= (y/N)
then x 6≡ ±y (mod N).
Proof. Suppose x ≡ ±y (mod N). Then
(x/N) = (±y/N) = (±1/N)(y/N) = (y/N),
since (−1/N) = (−1/p)(−1/q) = (−1)(−1) = 1.
2.2.1 The Binary Tree
A binary tree allows the bill C to be subdivided into pieces such that each sub-
divided piece is worth any desired value less than C and the total value of all
pieces is equal to C. The table is a tree of t levels, in which each node has two
offspring nodes. The root node is located at the top of the tree. At the ith level,
there are 2i−1 nodes. To demonstrate how the tree works in this cash system,
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Figure 2.2: Cash values for nodes
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The nodes of the ith level correspond to $100/2i−1, so the amounts that can be
spent are $25, $50, $75, and $100.
Suppose Alice uses $75 first and then uses $25. For spending the $75, she can
use node n00 worth $50 and node n010 worth $25. She then uses node n011 to
spend the remaining $25.
The restrictions to the bill spending are as follows:
1. The value of a node n is the total of the values of the nodes that are the
direct offsprings of n.
2. When a node is spent, all descendant nodes and all ancestor nodes of this
node cannot be used.
3. No node can be used more than once.
2.3 The Electronic Cash Scheme
2.3.1 Initialization
The bank (B) generates RSA keys






B), . . . ,




B), . . . are public keys and dB, d
′
B, . . . are the corresponding
secret keys. (eB, nB) corresponds to the electronic license that B issues, and
(e′B, n
′
B), . . . correspond to the values of the electronic bills that B issues. Each
possible value of a coin has a different signature key. A security parameter K
(for example, K = 40) and cryptographic hash functions, fΓ, fB, fΩ, g are set by
the Bank. The hash functions are used to generate the numbers associated to
the binary tree.
10
2.3.2 Opening an Account and Obtaining an Electronic
License
The Customer U has identification number IDU . The Customer generates an
RSA key (eU , nU ; dU ), and publishes it. When the Customer opens an account
at the bank B, the bank issues an electronic license L. The Customer U obtains
L while opening the account by the following protocol.
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ K, Customer U chooses a random value ai and a Williams
integer Ni = piqi, where pi ≡ 3 (mod 8) and qi ≡ 7 (mod 8).
2. U chooses random integers ri ∈ ZnB and forms the numbers
Si = IDU‖ai‖(g(IDU‖ai))dU mod nU
S1,i‖S2,i = Si




i g(Ii‖Ni) mod nB,
where ‖ denotes concatenation. U sends the numbers Wi to the bank B.
3. B chooses some random set of K/2 indices i1, . . . , iK/2, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ K,
and sends these to U .
4. U sends the following to B:
ai, pi, qi, (g(IDU‖ai))dU mod nU , IDU , ri
for all i 6∈ {ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ K/2}. B checks that they are valid.
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It is important to observe that B has signed the numbers g(Iij‖Nij) without
knowing their values. U had disguised these values with reBi . This is called a
blind signature and is a key point in protecting anonymity of U . If B knows the
values of g(Iij‖Nij), then B can identify U as follows: When the coin is spent,
U sends Iij and Nij to B. B is then able to compute
∏
g(Iij‖Nij ) and compare
it with the stored list of values produced from creating the coins. He can then
determine which user corresponds to this value.
2.3.3 Creating a Coin
The Customer U wants to receive an electronic bill C worth $100 from the Bank
B. The value of the bill corresponds to (e′B, n
′
B). The following protocol is
conducted to create the coin:




where r ∈R Zn′B , where ∈R means a random choice.
2. B gives Zd
′
B mod n′B to U and charges $100 to U’s account.
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2.3.4 Spending the Coin
To illustrate the spending protocol easily, we will follow an example from [9] of
the Customer paying $75 to the Merchant M out of the $100 he had received
from the Bank. The protocol is based on a binary tree of three levels, as shown
in Figure 2.1.
1. The Customer computes
Γij ,0 = 〈fΓ(C‖0‖Nij)〉QR
for 1 ≤ j ≤ K/2.
2. U computes
Xij ,00 = [Γ
1/4
ij ,0
mod Nij ]−1 (corresponding to $50),
and




1/8 mod Nij ]−1 (corresponding to $25),
where Ωij,0 = 〈fΩ(C‖0‖Nij)〉1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ K/2.
3. U sends (Iij , Nij ,Xij ,00,Xij ,010) for 1 ≤ j ≤ K/2, and (L,C) to the Mer-
chant.


















































Figure 2.3: The X values
Here are the definitions in the general case:















The computation of the 2tth root is done by taking successive square roots
mod Ni. At each stage except the last, the square root is chosen so as to
be the one that is a square mod Ni.
4. M verifies the validity of the license L for (Iij , Nij ), and the signature C
for L. The Merchant computes Ωij ,0 and fγ(C‖0‖Nij) for 1 ≤ j ≤ K/2. He
also verifies the validity of Xij ,00, and Xij ,010 by checking that the following
statements hold:
(Xij ,00/Nij ) = (Xij ,010/Nij ) = −1




fΓ(C‖0‖Nij) mod Nij ,
where dij ∈ {±1,±2}.
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5. The Merchant randomly selects bits Eij,00, Eij ,010 ∈ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ j ≤ K/2.
He sends them to U .
6. The Customer computes
Λij,00 = 〈fΛ(C‖00‖Nij )〉QR
Λij,010 = 〈fΛ(C‖010‖Nij )〉QR












and sends Yij ,00, Yij ,010 to M , for 1 ≤ j ≤ K/2.
7. M verifies that
(Yij,00/Nij ) = (−1)
Eij,00
(Yij ,010/Nij ) = (−1)
Eij,010




Y 2ij ,00 = d
′
ij
fΛ(C‖00‖Nij ) mod Nij ,
where d′ij and d
′′
ij
are chosen in {±1,±2} so that the right-hand sides are
squares mod Nij . If these equations are valid, M accepts the $75 coin from
the Customer.
This protocol, of course, can be generalized to a case of withdrawing and
spending any amount of money (up to the value of the bill C).
2.3.5 The Bank Credits the Merchant’s Account
In order for the Bank to credit the Merchant’s account by the requested amount,
M first sends to B the history of the Customer’s spending protocol shown earlier.
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B checks the validity of the history and then stores it in its database. As we’ll
see later, if B sees a double payment, B reveals the secret information, Sij for
some j, of the Customer. This contains IDU , so the user is revealed.
2.4 Correctness
The protocol presented in [9] satisfies five of the criteria mentioned earlier, namely,
(1) independence, (2) security, (3) privacy, (4) off-line payment, and (6) divisi-
bility. It is quite obvious that the protocol satisfies (1) and (4).
(3) privacy: Since factoring is difficult for B and M , they cannot obtain any
knowledge about the identity of U with non-trivial probability.
(6) divisibility: If the previously mentioned restrictions on the usage of the
binary tree are satisfied, we have the divisibility condition satisfied.
(2) security: There are two possible types of double spending. First, the
Customer can attempt to spend the same node in the binary tree twice. Second,
he can attempt to spend two distinct nodes, where one node is an ancestor to
the other.
Case I: Two distinct nodes. In this case, one node is a descendant of the
other. We have two subcases. We will illustrate each by an example. For each
node spent, a random set of indices ij was chosen. With high probability there
will be overlap between the sets chosen for each spending. Let i be an index in
the overlap.

















i,0 . They cannot differ by sign since their Jacobi symbols are different.
Therefore, the Bank can factor Ni. This allows the Bank to identify U , as follows.
The Customer U has sent Ii to the Merchant. Note that Ii = I1,i‖I2,i. So
the Bank receives I1,i and I2,i. Also, I1,i ≡ S21,i mod Ni. B has found the
factorization of Ni, due to double-spending. B can find the square root of I1,i
mod pi and mod qi. By the Chinese Remainder theorem, there are four choices
for the square root of I1,i mod Ni. Hence there are four choices for S1,i and,
similarly, four choices for S2,i. So there are a total of 16 choices for Si = S1,i‖S2,i.
Since Si contains IDU , there are at most sixteen choices for IDU (sixteen can be
reduced because of the structure of Si), and probably only one that corresponds
to a person. Therefore, U is caught.












since the left side is a square.
Then we observe that Xi,00 and X
2

















by the choice of Ωi,00. Therefore, the two square roots cannot differ by sign since
their Jacobi symbols are different. Therefore, the Bank can factor Ni. This allows
the Bank to identify U , as before.
Case II: Spending one node twice. For concreteness, call the node n00.
We will illustrate by an example. For each time the node is spent, a random set of
indices ij was chosen. With high probability there will be overlap between the sets
chosen for each spending. For each index i in the overlap, each Merchant chose
a challenge bit Ei. With reasonable probability, one of the indices in the overlap
has different challenges, from different Merchants. Let i be such an index. Say
E′i = 0 and E
′
i = 1. Then, during the spending protocol, the following responses
were sent to the Merchants, who gave them to the Bank:
Y ′i,00 = [Λ
1/2
i,00]1
Y ′′i,00 = [Λ
1/2
i,00]−1.
The Bank then obtains two distinct square roots of Λi,00 and can factor Ni. This
allows the Bank to identify U , as before.
2.5 Transferring Cash
Finally, Okamoto and Ohta demonstrate their system satisfying the criterion (5),
transferability. We keep the earlier example used, where the value of the coin
is $100, customer U1, who has spent $75 of it, transfers the remaining $25 to
customer U2 and U2 uses $25 at shop M . The protocol is identical except for
one additional step, in which U1 transfers C to U2. We describe this step in the
following:
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1. U2 assumes the role of the Merchant in the earlier protocol. U1 gives node
n011 to U2.
2. U1 digitally signs a message that includes the coin, the node it corresponds
to, and the license of U2. This information records the transfer in step 1
and protects both Customers.
3. The rest of the protocol is the same as the earlier one without the transfer,






The paper [7] presents an improvement to the divisible off-line electronic cash
scheme constructed by Okamoto and Ohta earlier. It is based on discrete loga-
rithms rather than factorization.
Okamoto and Ohta’s earlier electronic cash system has two sets of weakness:
the amount of required communication between the bank and the merchant, and
the needed memory size of the bank’s database. Eng and Okamoto reduce the
memory requirement to less than 1/10 of the Okamoto-Ohta system.
3.2 Preliminaries
Let p and q be large primes where q | (p − 1). Let x ∈R X indicate that x is
randomly and uniformly selected from X. Concatenation is denoted by ‖. If b


































n000 n001 n010 n011
Figure 3.1: The nodes
computable one-way hash function.
Eng and Okamoto use a binary tree approach as Okamoto and Ohta did.
The root node of a binary tree is denoted by n0, and the remaining nodes are
represented with subscripts 0s and 1s, where “0” represents a left branch and “1”
represents a right branch. For example, the root node’s children are written as
n00 and n01. And their children are expressed as n000 and n001, and n010 and n011,
respectively.
Similar to what Okamoto and Ohta did, each coin of worth w is represented
by a tree of (1 + log2w) levels and w leaves. The leaves are nodes that are at
the bottom level of the binary tree, and the root node at the top represents the
value w of the coin. As one goes down each level, each node at the next level
represents half of the value of its parent’s node. This construction is repeated
until the bottom row consists of nodes of worth $1. For example, if a coin is
worth $8, then the tree has four levels and 8 bottom-nodes of $1 each.
We will show later that we can extend this binary structure to dividing a coin
into any number of pieces. For example, we could imitate the decimal structure
of ordinary cash systems. However, this would be much harder to do in Okamoto
and Ohta’s system.
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Divisibility can now be implemented under one rule: Once a node is spent,
neither its parent nor any of its children nodes is available to be spent. This rule
prevents double spending. If double spending occurs, the perpetrator is identified
by the route that defines the node being double-spent.
3.3 The Electronic Cash Scheme
3.3.1 Initialization
The initialization is based on the Okamoto–Ohta scheme.
1. The Customer U has a public key m = gx11 g
x2
2 mod p.
2. U proves to the bank that it knows the private key (x1, x2) using the fol-
lowing protocol:





(b) The Bank B returns a challenge message α, which is different each
time. Note that the bank has no information about (x1, x2).
(c) The Customer sends y1 = r1 + αx1 mod q and y2 = r2 + αx2 mod q
to the bank who verifies that
gy11 g
y2
2 ≡ βmα mod p.
3.3.2 Creating a Coin
A spender wants to withdraw w = 2` from his account. The protocols are based
on an earlier scheme of Brands.
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Let p, q, g, g1, g2 be system parameters provided by the Bank B, where g, g1,
and g2 have order q mod p. Let I = g
u
1 mod p be the identity of the Customer
U , where u is U ’s secret key. Let h = gx mod p be the public key of the Bank,
where x is B’s secret key.
The protocol proceeds as follows:




2 mod p. The
Customer U sends his identity, I = gu1 mod p, to Bank B. Here, u is the
secret identity number of U , and I is his public number. If someone finds
u, they can identify U .
2. B subtracts w = 2L dollars from U ’s account. B chooses w ∈R Zq and
sends z = mx mod p, a = gw mod p, b = mw mod p to U .
3. U randomly selects s, t, v ∈R Zq and calculates m′ = ms mod p, z′ = zs
mod p, a′ = atgv mod p, b′ = bst(m′)v mod p, c′ = H(m′, z′, a′, b′, T ), and
c = c′/t mod q. Then U sends c to B. Note that s is used to mask m.
4. B sends r = xc + w mod q to U .
5. U verifies the validity of z, a, b by checking that mr = zcb mod p and
gr = hca mod p, and then calculates r′ = rt + v (mod q).
3.3.3 Computation of t-values and r-values for Leaf Nodes
The Customer chooses a random value e as a secret seed value. Every node is
assigned a t-value. Let n0j1j2...jv , where ji ∈ {0, 1}, be a node. Its t-value is
denoted by t0j1j2···jv . If n0j1j2 ···j` is a leaf of the tree, its t-value is defined to be
t0j1j2···j` = H(e‖0j1j2 · · · j`).
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If we have defined the t-values of a node, we can define two “r-values” of the
node by
t0j1j2···jv = (r0j1j2 ···jv ,1‖r0j1j2···jv ,2) where r0j1j2 ···jv ,i ∈ {0, 1}|q|.
The t-values of non-leaf nodes are determined inductively from the r-values
of their children. If the t-values of a non-leaf node’s left and right children are
t0j1j2 ···jv0 = (r0j1j2···jv0,1‖r0j1j2···jv0,2)
t0j1j2 ···jv1 = (r0j1j2···jv1,1‖r0j1j2···jv1,2)










In this fashion, we obtain t-values for all nodes, all the way up to the root node.
3.3.4 Spending the Coin
Spending the coin requires two stages in Eng and Okamoto’s scheme. The first
stage is coin authentication.
1. The Customer U gives m′ = gus1 g
s
2 mod p, T (computed when the coin was
created), and the signature sign(m′, T ) = {z′, a′, b′, r′} to the Merchant.
2. M checks that m′ 6= 1 mod p.
3. M computes c′ and verifies that the following three equations hold:
gr
′ ≡ hc′a′ mod p
mr
′ ≡ (z′)c′b′ mod p
c′ ≡ H(m′, z′, a′, b′, T )
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This completes the Merchant’s verification of the Bank’s signature on m′ and T .
The next stage is what Eng-Okamoto call “denomination revelation,” where
the Customer U reveals information on the nodes of the tree that represent the
coin. Suppose he spends the node n0j1j2...jk .
1. U reveals





which is the node’s contribution to the t-value of its ancestor node.
2. U then reveals the information that is used to compute the t-values for all
























3. Then M travels up the tree from the node n0j1j2 ...jk . He is able to compute
all its ancestors’ t-values including the root t-value t0. Then he can verify
T and the signature of m′.
4. M presents a challenge α ∈ Z∗p, which is a function of the date, time,
Merchant’s identity, and other variants.
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5. U responds with
y1 = r0j1j2 ...jk ,1 + αus mod q
y2 = r0j1j2 ...jk ,2 + αs mod q
6. M verifies that
(g1)
y1(g2)
y2 ≡ β0j1j2...jk(m′)α mod p.
This technique is quite similar to a zero knowledge proof, where the Customer is
able to prove that he has a legitimate coin without revealing too much informa-
tion. Only the t-values and r-values of the ancestor nodes of n0j1j2 .jk are revealed
to M and B.
Suppose the coin (m′, T, sign(m′, T )) is worth 2` and that U wants to spend
$x from it. We suppose that the binary representation of x is b1b2 . . . b`+1 in the
` + 1 level binary tree.
Let ν = #{bi | bi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ `+1} be the Hamming weight of x. It indicates
the number of nodes that will be used for spending $x. Whenever bi = 1, it says
that a node at the i-th level is used. For example, if x = 0100100, then ` = 6
and ν = 2. So, he can use a node at the 2nd level, say, n00, and a node at the
5th level, say, n01000.





















Observe that there will be ν values of β from Step 1 of this protocol. In the
example of x = 0100100, there will be two β values. If `′ is the smallest value for
which bi = 0 for all i > `
′, and if the ν nodes that are used are optimally selected,
then (`′ − ν) hashed values are revealed. In the example of x = 0100100, three
(= 5 − 2) hash values are revealed.
3.3.5 The Bank Credits the Merchant’s Account
Crediting the Merchant’s account is done the same way as in Okamoto and Ohta’s
scheme, by sending the transcript of the transaction to the Bank.
3.4 Security
The goal of the security is to ensure that the Customer’s identity is protected,
except when a coin is incorrectly spent. There are two possible types of double
spending. First, the Customer can attempt to spend the same node in the binary
tree twice. Second, he can attempt to spend two distinct nodes, where one node
is an ancestor to the other. We use an example of spending $1 out of a $4-coin
to illustrate how both types of double spending are caught by the Eng-Okamoto
scheme.
Since the coin is worth $4, there are four leaf-nodes and their t-values are
computed in the following way:
t000 = H(e‖000), t001 = H(e‖001), t010 = H(e‖010), t011 = H(e‖011).
for a randomly selected value e. As shown earlier, the t-values of the remaining
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nodes are computed as follows:
t0j1j2 = (r0j1j2 ,1‖r0j1j2,2) for all j1, j2 ∈ {0, 1}























We can now proceed to examine two possible scenarios of double spending.
Case 1. Spending the same node twice. Suppose U tries to spend n001
twice. During the spending protocol, we saw that n001’s contribution to the t-
value of its ancestor node, β001, is revealed. We also note that hash values of
its sibling and of the siblings of all its ancestor nodes are also revealed, namely,
H(gr000,11 g
r000,2




2 ). When the Merchant presents a challenge, α,
in the first spending, and another challenge, α′, in the second spending, the
Customer returns two sets of responses. In the first spending, he returns y1 =
r001,1 + αus mod q and y2 = r001,2 + αs. In the second spending, he returns
y′1 = r001,1 + α
′us mod q and y′2 = r001,2 + α
′s. Then by solving the system of
equations, the Merchant and the Bank can retrieve u and s.
Case 2. Spending a node’s child node. Suppose U spends n00 and then
tries to spend its child node, n001. From the spending of n00, the Customer
returns the response to a challenge. Namely, y1 = r00,1 +αus and y2 = r00,2 +αs.
If U then spends n001, the Customer reveals β001 and H(β000). Note that




































Figure 3.2: Node n001 is spent
This enables the Merchant to deduce the values of u and s, since he now knows
y1, y2, r00,1 and r00,2. So the violation is caught.
Figure 3.2 shows what is revealed when node n001 is spent.
3.5 Higher Divisibility
We now extend the Eng-Okamoto scheme to a more general case. Suppose we
divide each node into three children. We will demonstrate the analogous two
cases of double spending. Observe that the t-values of non-leaf nodes are now
computed by three beta-values of their children, while each node still has only
two r-values.
More generally, a similar technique can be applied to dividing a coin into any
number of pieces, where the number of pieces does not have to be the same at
each node. This allows us to mimic the real cash system of U.S. dollars, quarters,
dimes, nickels, and pennies.
The Customer chooses a random value e as a secret seed value. Every node





u, T,m, z, a,
b, s, t, v,m′,

























β of the node,
α, y1, y2
Table 3.1: Who knows what during the Eng-Okamoto protocol
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denoted by t0j1j2···jv . If n0j1j2 ···j` is a leaf of the tree, its t-value is defined to be
t0j1j2···j` = H(e‖0j1j2 · · · j`).
If we have defined the t-values of a node, we can define two “r-values” of the
node by
t0j1j2···jv = (r0j1j2 ···jv ,1‖r0j1j2···jv ,2) where r0j1j2 ···jv ,i ∈ {0, 1}|q|.
The t-values of non-leaf nodes are determined inductively from the r-values of
their children. If the t-values of a non-leaf node’s left, middle, and right children
are
t0j1j2 ···jv0 = (r0j1j2···jv0,1‖r0j1j2···jv0,2)
t0j1j2 ···jv1 = (r0j1j2···jv1,1‖r0j1j2···jv1,2)
t0j1j2 ···jv2 = (r0j1j2···jv2,1‖r0j1j2···jv2,2)













In this fashion, we obtain t-values for all nodes, all the way up to the root node.
The spending protocol is identical to the binary structure, except that the
hash values of both its siblings and of both of the siblings of each of its ancestor
nodes are also revealed.
We can now proceed to examine two possible scenarios of double spending.
Case 1. Spending the same node twice. Suppose U tries to spend n000
twice. During the spending protocol, we saw that n000’s contribution to the t-
value of its ancestor node, β000, is revealed. We also note that hash values of both
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the Merchant presents a challenge, α, in the first spending, and another challenge,
α′, in the second spending, the Customer returns two sets of responses. In the
first spending, he returns y1 = r000,1 + αus mod q and y2 = r000,2 + αs. In the
second spending, he returns y′1 = r000,1 +α
′us mod q and y′2 = r000,2 +α
′s. Then
by solving the system of equations, the Merchant and the Bank can retrieve u
and s.
Case 2. Spending a node’s child node. Suppose U spends n00 and then
tries to spend its child node, n000. From the spending of n00, the Customer
returns the response to a challenge. Namely, y1 = r00,1 +αus and y2 = r00,2 +αs.
If U then spends n000, the Customer reveals β000, H(β001), and H(β002). Note
that
H(H(β000)‖H(β001)‖H(β002)) = t00 = (r00,1‖r00,2).
This enables the Merchant to deduce the values of u and s, since he now knows





We will now look at a few more systems where they claim to provide untraceabil-
ity or unlinkability. We will then study some papers that found flaws in these
systems.
4.2 Damg̊ard’s Scheme
In Crypto ’90, Damg̊ard [5] presented an untraceable online payment system
with provable security against abuse by individuals. Pfitzmann and Waidner [11]
show how to break the untraceability of Damg̊ard’s payment system. They also
introduce possibilities to improve it further with new features.
In untraceable payment systems, the Bank is needed to approve each payment.
However they do not allow the Bank to observe the activities of the individuals.
For example, when individuals withdraw money from one account and deposit it
into another account, the Bank should not be able to trace the activity to find
out the identities of the sender and the receiver. The security of the systems
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relies, for example, on an RSA scheme so that one cannot double spend or create
coins themselves. Pfitzmann and Waidner show that Damg̊ard’s payment system
is not untraceable at all.
Damg̊ard’s system uses a provably secure signature scheme. The Customer
gives m′ and the signature (m′, T, sign(m′, T )) to the Merchant, who gives it to
B. During the depositing protocol, the Bank is able to obtain these numbers,
m′ and (m′, T, sign(m′, T )). Then B can store the history and would be able to
trace the identity of the Customer.
Essentially, the system enables the Bank to see the signature. This gives the
Bank ways of tracing the coin in some cases.
Pfitzmann and Waidner repair the untraceability flaw of Damg̊ard’s system
by requiring the Customer to use a zero-knowledge proof to show that he has the
signature during the deposit protocol.
4.3 D’Amiano and Di Crescenzo’s Cash System
D’Amiano and Di Crescenzo [6] claim to present an electronic cash system that
provide complete untraceability. They also claim that the cash maintains its
size as it gets transferred from one person to another. Pfitzmann, Schunter, and
Waidner [10] break this system and show that D’Amiano and Di Crescenzo’s
scheme does not provide any untraceability. They identify how untraceability is




The initialization and the withdrawal protocols are almost identical to those of
Okamoto-Ohta and Eng-Okamoto. When a double-spending occurs, the Bank
receives the same coin twice in two different deposits. B can then broadcast a
request for all previous users of the coin to send in the transcripts or information
they have about the coin. Then the Bank is able to determine all previous owners
of the coin. Either
1. one of the users who does not cooperate is detected,
2. one of the users who paid the coin twice is detected, or
3. two withdrawals of the same coin are detected.
In case (1), the attacker who does not cooperate is presumed to be guilty. In case
(2), the Bank has detected what it had hoped to find, whereas case (3) does not
pose any problem since the money has been withdrawn from the account.
4.3.2 The Untraceability Flaw
Pfitzmann and Waidner show that the untraceability is not ensured at all in this
system. Suppose that there are two attackers in the system. In Figure 4.1, the
attackers are denoted as A1 and A2, and the honest customers are U1, U2, U3,
and U4. Each arrow indicates a payment. Suppose A2 tries to double-spend, as
indicated by two arrows originating from A2. When the Bank traces the coin
back, A2 and U4 both show they received the coin from U2. The coins that came
from A1 are completely identical, so U2 cannot prove that the coin was given to











































Figure 4.1: A double-spending scenario
A2 is completely free of risk. So, U1 is incorrectly detected to be double-spending
and punished.
Note that if A2 did not double-spend, U2 would still have been given the same
coin twice as shown in Figure 4.1. This would have been a normal transaction.
Even if U2 detects that a coin he once spent came back to him, he would not find
it suspicious. In real paper cash system, the same can occur. Once the Customer
spends a paper bill, it may come back to him at one point.
Pfitzmann and Waidner argue that a different signature must be given when
paying a coin to the same person. Interactively, this can be done with a challenge
or a transaction number. Transaction numbers and comparing a coin with all
previously received ones are less efficient but are possible ways to prevent this
type of attack. Non-interactively, time stamps can be used.
It is important to note that Chaum and Pedersen [4] make an even stronger
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observation about the size of the cash. They show that it is impossible to en-
sure the transferability without growing the size of the coin. This shows that
D’Amiano-Di Crescenzo’s scheme is fundamentally flawed.
4.4 Canard and Gouget’s Scheme
Canard and Gouget [2] present an off-line divisible e-cash scheme with unlink-
ability. They present security tags that can protect that anonymity of honest
customers and that can reveal the identity only when the Customer cheats. This
is done without using a trusted third party.
The main feature of their scheme is the use of non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs. They are used to verify the possession of various information without
transferring any content information. The beauty of the non-interactive proofs is
that they can be reproduced. The transcripts of the proofs that the Customer has
the information are sent. This solves the linkability problem, commonly found
in other systems. It is not obvious, however, how we can improve this system to




The paper [8] by Ferguson presents the idea of n-spendable coins, where each
coin can be spent up to n times without revealing the Customer. U is revealed,
however, when the coin is used for the n + 1st time.
The advantage of allowing U to spend a coin several times by this scheme
is its efficiency. It requires less storage than using multiple 1-spendable coins.
Especially for systems like subway fare, the idea is useful, even though linkability
is not prevented.
Ferguson generalizes the case of 1-spendable coins by using a secret sharing
scheme. The generalization introduces the use of a higher degree polynomial to
mask the identity of U .
U has a polynomial u +
∑n
i=1 kiX
i mod a prime q, where u is the secret
identity number of U and the secret numbers k1, . . . , kn are produced during the
initialization stage.
Then the challenge-response consists of the following steps:
1. M sends a challenge x ∈R Zq.





If the coin is spent ` times, U reveals ` points on the graph of the polynomial.
If ` ≤ n, this information does not reveal u. However, if U spends the coin for
the n + 1st time, his identity is easily revealed by being able to construct the
polynomial from the n + 1 points.
Eng-Okamoto’s case is a variation of the case when n = 1. M sends a challenge
α to U . Then U sends the value at X = α of the linear polynomials r000,1 + sX
and r000,2 + usX. Suppose U double-spends the coin. Then, with the second
challenge α′, the coefficients of the polynomial are revealed.
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